OUN, UPA, SS “Galizien” and auxiliary police: how not to confuse them

01

Start with the narrowest defensible description

An ideology, an organisation, a military unit and a local group are four different levels of attribution.

Public debate often compresses several structures into one word: “OUN”, “UPA”, “SS Galizien” or simply “Ukrainian nationalists”. Such shorthand may indicate a broad political milieu, but it is not enough to identify who planned, commanded or carried out a specific action. A reliable record should move step by step from political affiliation to faction, command structure, unit, local participants and, when the evidence permits, named individuals. Each step needs its own source. ^1,2

The opposite error is equally serious: treating every organisational boundary as proof that no relationship existed. Personnel moved between structures, OUN activists entered occupation institutions, former auxiliary policemen joined insurgent units, and political networks tried to influence military formations. These connections must be documented without turning overlap into identity. “Linked to”, “recruited from”, “under the command of” and “identical with” are not interchangeable expressions. ^2,11

02

OUN was a political and underground movement

Its name describes an organisation founded before the Second World War, not a single wartime combat unit.

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists was founded in 1929 through the merger of the Ukrainian Military Organisation and several nationalist groups. It combined an ideological programme, clandestine organisation, propaganda, political violence and plans for national revolution. Describing OUN as an “army” therefore obscures its character. It had leadership bodies, territorial networks, youth and propaganda structures, security organs and, at different moments, armed formations connected to it. ¹

The organisation’s ideology and methods changed over time, but the changes did not erase earlier programmes, practices or responsibility. A record that says only “OUN” should therefore prompt further questions: which year, which faction, which regional leadership, which local cell and what kind of activity? A political directive, an underground arrest, a propaganda campaign and a field attack are not the same kind of act even when they occur within the same movement. ^1,7

03

OUN-M and OUN-B were rival factions

After the 1940 split, the generic label OUN became increasingly imprecise.

The conflict over leadership after Yevhen Konovalets’s death produced two organisations associated with Andrii Melnyk and Stepan Bandera. They had separate leaderships, networks, tactical choices and relations with German authorities. Both expected the German-Soviet war to create an opening for Ukrainian statehood, but they competed for cadres and legitimacy. Writing “OUN” for events after 1940 can therefore conceal a central fact: the factions were not one command structure. ¹

The 30 June 1941 proclamation in Lviv was an OUN-B initiative, not an action of every Ukrainian nationalist organisation. German repression of Bandera and other activists soon followed, but that repression does not by itself cancel the earlier cooperation, expectations or participation of some nationalists in institutions created during the invasion. The sequence must be shown in full: tactical cooperation, an attempted unilateral state act, German refusal and arrests, then changing forms of underground activity. ^1,7,5

04

UPA was a military formation, but the name had a history

Not every group that used the name UPA belonged to the later OUN-B controlled army.

Taras Borovets used the name Ukrainian Insurgent Army for his Polisian Sich forces before OUN-B established the formation that later dominated the name. OUN-M also organised armed detachments. During 1943 the stronger OUN-B structures disarmed or absorbed rival formations and consolidated control. A source that says “UPA” for 1942 or early 1943 therefore needs a date and commander, because the same abbreviation could refer to competing organisations. ^2,3

The later UPA developed territorial commands, tactical sectors, field units, training structures, logistics and intelligence. Its organisation changed as the fronts moved and Soviet repression intensified. The broad name “UPA unit” may still be too vague for an event record. Whenever possible, the atlas should identify the regional command, military district, tactical sector, kurin, sotnia or local self-defence group, and should distinguish the field army from OUN’s Security Service. ^2,6

05

OUN-B controlled UPA, but the two names are not synonyms

Political direction and military membership overlapped without becoming identical.

By 1943 OUN-B had gained political control over the dominant UPA structures and placed its cadres in command and security functions. This makes it legitimate to study UPA within the history of the Bandera faction. It does not make every OUN-B activist a UPA soldier, every UPA fighter a formal OUN member, or every action by a local nationalist group an operation ordered by the UPA command. Organisational responsibility still has to be demonstrated for the event under review. ^1,2

The same caution applies to OUN’s Security Service, commonly abbreviated SB. It was an underground security and counter-intelligence organ connected to OUN-B, responsible for investigations, discipline, intelligence and coercion. It should not be confused with the German Sicherheitsdienst, abbreviated SD, or automatically with ordinary UPA field units. Similar abbreviations and overlapping personnel create one of the most persistent errors in descriptions of arrests and executions. ^1,8

06

Auxiliary police belonged to the German occupation system

Local recruitment did not change who created the chain of command and assigned its tasks.

German occupation authorities created multiple police structures: municipal and local police, Schutzmannschaft battalions, gendarmerie, Order Police units, Security Police and SD organs. Their names, uniforms and administrative subordination varied by territory and date. The phrase “Ukrainian police” usually describes the ethnicity or local designation of personnel, not an independent Ukrainian state institution. These formations operated inside a German legal, administrative and operational framework. ^8,9

Command under the occupier does not remove the agency of local personnel. Policemen guarded ghettos, conducted searches, escorted deportations, rounded up victims, seized property and in numerous places participated directly in shootings. The exact role differed between operations and individuals, so a record should name both the German organising authority and the local formation. Writing only “the Germans” can erase indispensable local participation; writing only “Ukrainian police” can erase the German system that organised the crime. ^12,13,10

07

One police label could cover different functions

Station duty, guard service, anti-partisan operations and mass murder require separate descriptions.

A local police station and a mobile Schutzmannschaft battalion were not the same organisational object. A station might perform daily policing, guard duties and arrests within one district, while a battalion could be transferred and used in anti-partisan or killing operations. The same person could serve in more than one structure over time. The atlas should therefore record the unit number, station, commander, place of service and date whenever these details survive. ^8,14

Terminology in sources is inconsistent. Witnesses may write “militia”, German documents may use Hilfspolizei or Schutzmannschaft, Soviet files may use a broad category of collaborators, and later accounts may translate all of these as “Ukrainian police”. The editor should preserve the wording of the source but add a controlled classification in a separate field. Otherwise linguistic variation becomes a false multiplication of units or, in the opposite direction, several distinct formations collapse into one. ^9,12,13

08

Personnel transfers connect histories without merging organisations

The mass movement of policemen into insurgent units in 1943 is a relationship that must be shown precisely.

In Volhynia, thousands of members of the German auxiliary police deserted or were transferred into the expanding OUN-B led insurgency in 1943. They brought weapons, training, knowledge of German procedures and experience acquired during occupation service. This movement is one of the strongest personnel bridges between the occupation police and UPA. It supports analysis of continuity in cadres and skills, but it does not mean that a police action in 1942 was automatically an UPA action before the transfer occurred. ^2,11

Biographical records should therefore be chronological rather than based on one permanent label. The same person might successively be an OUN activist, local policeman, deserter, UPA fighter and émigré veteran. Responsibility for each period must be assessed from the role held at that time. A later affiliation cannot be projected backwards as the formal command of an earlier act, although it may be relevant to networks, motives, recruitment and the transfer of operational knowledge. ^2,11

09

SS “Galizien” was a Waffen-SS division under German command

Its Ukrainian recruitment base does not turn it into OUN or UPA, and its later renaming does not erase its institutional origin.

The division was announced in April 1943 as a German Waffen-SS formation recruited mainly in District Galicia. German authorities authorised it, German SS structures trained it, and German officers occupied the central command positions. Ukrainian committees and public figures supported recruitment for their own political reasons, including hopes of creating trained national cadres, but those ambitions did not transform the division into an independent Ukrainian army or place it under OUN or UPA command. ^4,20,21

The formation changed official names as it was organised, rebuilt after the Battle of Brody and, near the end of the war, incorporated into the projected Ukrainian National Army. These changes are relevant to dating documents and identifying insignia, but they do not permit the Waffen-SS phase to be omitted. A record should use the name valid at the time of the event and can add later names as aliases. Postwar memory labels are not substitutes for wartime administrative records. ^4,21,20

10

The Galician SS police regiments were not the division’s field regiments

Related recruitment and administrative origins created a connection, not organisational identity.

More volunteers reported for recruitment than the division could initially absorb. Some were organised in Galician SS volunteer police regiments under German police structures. These regiments were connected to the recruitment project and are often described as “linked to” the division, but they were not simply the division’s numbered infantry regiments. The distinction matters because police units could be deployed in pacification and anti-partisan actions before or outside the division’s front-line operations. ^15,16,20

The phrase “soldiers of SS Galizien” is therefore sometimes too broad for crimes attributed to the 4th Galician SS Police Regiment. A precise formulation should give the police regiment’s full name, note its recruitment connection with the division, state the German command framework and list other participating forces separately. This wording does not minimise responsibility. It prevents a real unit from disappearing inside a famous but less exact label. ^15,16

11

Nachtigall, Roland and local militias require their own records

Earlier German-sponsored units cannot be renamed retrospectively as UPA or SS “Galizien”.

The Nachtigall and Roland battalions were created in 1941 in cooperation with German military intelligence and included Ukrainian nationalist cadres. They preceded both the dominant OUN-B UPA and the 1943 Waffen-SS division. Some individuals later held other positions, which creates biographical continuity, but the battalions retain their own command framework, dates and operational history. The same rule applies to local militias formed during the first weeks of the invasion. ^7,9

A useful database should therefore allow one person to be linked to several organisations in dated intervals. It should not force a single permanent affiliation. For each interval it should record role, rank, unit, place, superior authority and evidence. This model makes transitions visible and prevents later commemoration from flattening a complicated career into a heroic or accusatory slogan. It also makes it possible to separate documented service from unverified claims. ^1,2,7

12

Huta Pieniacka shows why precision changes the history

The event involved a named police regiment, a German command framework and additional participating forces.

IPN descriptions of the massacre of 28 February 1944 identify the 4th Galician Volunteer SS Police Regiment, connected through recruitment to the SS “Galizien” project and operating under German command. They also attribute participation to UPA units and local nationalist or paramilitary groups. Compressing this into “UPA murdered the village” removes the police regiment and German framework. Compressing it into “the SS did it” removes additional local forces that the investigation names. ^15,16

The safest event formulation is layered: principal identified unit, command framework, supporting or participating formations, and the degree of certainty for each. If sources disagree, the disagreement belongs in the record. Precision is not a way to distribute blame until nobody is responsible. It is the method by which each participant’s responsibility becomes testable, comparable and open to correction when new documents or forensic findings appear. ^15,16,20

13

Holocaust records require both German and local chains of action

Roundups, guarding, transport and shooting could be divided among several formations.

Yad Vashem and USHMM records repeatedly show German Security Police, SD, gendarmerie or Order Police working with locally recruited auxiliary police. In one operation local policemen might surround a ghetto and drive people to an assembly point, while German personnel organised transport or conducted the shooting. In another, local policemen also fired. A complete record should therefore describe tasks, not only list organisations. Functional participation can be decisive evidence even when command remained German. ^12,13,14,10

The relationship with nationalist organisations also has to be stated at the correct level. Scholarship documents OUN activists in the violence of summer 1941, recruitment or infiltration into police structures, and later movement of policemen into the OUN-led insurgency. These findings justify investigating institutional and personnel links. They do not justify replacing every German-directed police unit with the label UPA, especially for events before UPA’s dominant structure existed. ^7,11,9

14

Organisational criminality and individual guilt are different legal questions

Nuremberg’s judgment on the SS must be quoted with its scope and limitations.

The International Military Tribunal included the Waffen-SS within the SS organisation it declared criminal, but formulated conditions concerning knowledge, voluntary membership and personal implication, while excluding persons drafted without a real choice who committed no crimes. The judgment is therefore neither a declaration that the Waffen-SS was an ordinary neutral army nor a substitute for evidence against every individual. It establishes the institutional context and a legal framework that still requires careful application to persons and acts. ¹⁷

The same distinction should guide language about OUN, UPA and auxiliary police. A historian may establish that an organisation adopted a policy, created a coercive structure or supplied personnel for crimes. A criminal court may require proof of an individual’s acts, knowledge, intent or command responsibility. The atlas should not imitate a verdict where none exists, but it should not use the absence of an individual conviction to erase documented organisational policy or participation. ^17,18

15

The Deschênes Commission does not support either blanket guilt or blanket absolution

Its Canadian immigration inquiry addressed allegations against persons and groups in a specific legal context.

The Canadian Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals examined allegations that war criminals had entered Canada. Later official summaries note that it rejected blanket accusations against all members of units such as the Galicia Division and required evidence directed at individuals. That conclusion is important protection against collective guilt. It does not transform the division into an organisation outside the Waffen-SS, reverse the Nuremberg judgment or decide every allegation concerning every associated police regiment and local crime. ^18,19,17

The two legal statements answer different questions. Nuremberg addressed the criminal character of the SS organisation under the Tribunal’s Charter. Deschênes addressed evidence and remedies concerning alleged war criminals in Canada decades later. Quoting one as if it erased the other is a category error. The portal should present both, state their jurisdiction and purpose, and then return to the evidence for the particular person, unit and event under discussion. ^17,18,19

16

Uniforms, memoirs and postwar labels are clues, not final identifications

Attribution should be built by triangulating independent evidence.

Witnesses often identified attackers through language, insignia, uniforms, local knowledge or what perpetrators called themselves. Such testimony is indispensable, but wartime disguises, reused uniforms and unfamiliar formations could cause honest mistakes. German reports may conceal crimes behind administrative language; Soviet investigations may contain both valuable evidence and political framing; nationalist memoirs may minimise collaboration or violence. No category of source should be accepted or rejected automatically. ^9,20,11

The strongest attribution usually combines records from different origins: German orders or personnel lists, underground reports, survivor testimony, postwar investigations, unit histories, graves and material evidence. Agreement between independent sources raises confidence; conflict must remain visible. The portal should mark whether a formulation is confirmed, probable, contested or only reported by one source. A confident tone cannot substitute for a documented chain of evidence. ^21,15,12

17

A practical checklist for every event record

The portal should publish uncertainty explicitly rather than hide it behind a familiar acronym.

Before publishing a perpetrator field, check seven elements: the date; the exact place; the organisation and faction; the unit or local structure; the command framework; the function performed during the event; and the sources supporting each claim. Add personnel transitions only with dates. Preserve the source’s original wording, but map it to a controlled vocabulary. If only a broad label is defensible, say that it is broad and explain what remains unknown. ^8,15,21

Use four confidence levels. “Confirmed” requires several compatible sources or a strong primary record. “Probable” means the evidence converges but leaves a material gap. “Contested” means credible sources disagree. “Source-reported” means the portal is reproducing a claim that has not yet been independently confirmed. This system is more informative than choosing between absolute certainty and silence, and it prevents later readers from mistaking an editorial shorthand for a final judicial finding. ^15,17,19

Timeline

1. 3 February 1929: OUN founding congress concludes

   The new organisation merges the Ukrainian Military Organisation with nationalist associations and adopts a revolutionary state programme. ¹

2. 23 May 1938: Yevhen Konovalets is assassinated

   The death of OUN’s leader deepens the succession conflict that later produces rival factions. ¹

3. 10 February 1940: The OUN split becomes irreversible

   Bandera’s followers form a revolutionary leadership, creating the organisations later known as OUN-B and OUN-M. ¹

4. 22 June 1941: Germany attacks the Soviet Union

   The invasion creates the occupation setting in which OUN networks, German-sponsored units and local police structures expand. ^7,5

5. 30 June 1941: OUN-B proclaims a Ukrainian state in Lviv

   The unilateral proclamation is a Bandera-faction initiative and is rejected by the German authorities. ^1,7

6. 1 July 1941: The Lviv pogrom begins

   Anti-Jewish violence involves German instigation and organisation, local crowds and nationalist-linked actors, requiring layered attribution. ⁷

7. July 1941: German authorities arrest OUN-B leaders

   The arrests begin a new phase of relations but do not erase earlier cooperation or local participation in occupation institutions. ^1,7

8. 1 August 1941: District Galicia enters the General Government

   German occupation administration and police chains are reorganised in Eastern Galicia. ^9,10

9. spring 1942: Borovets reactivates forces under the UPA name

   The name UPA initially refers to a force independent of the later OUN-B dominated army. ^3,2

10. 22 August 1942: The Rozyszcze ghetto is liquidated

    German gendarmerie and Ukrainian auxiliary police perform different but connected tasks in the murder operation. ¹²

11. autumn 1942: OUN-B begins organising its own insurgent units

    These forces later consolidate the UPA name and command structure. ²

12. spring 1943: Auxiliary policemen move into the insurgency

    Large-scale desertions and transfers bring trained personnel and weapons into OUN-B controlled UPA structures. ^2,11

13. 28 April 1943: Formation of the SS “Galizien” division is announced

    The German Waffen-SS recruitment project begins in District Galicia with support from Ukrainian public committees. ^4,20

14. summer 1943: Galician SS volunteer police regiments are organised

    Surplus recruits are placed in German police formations related to, but organisationally distinct from, the division. ^16,20

15. 18 August 1943: Borovets’s force is disarmed

    OUN-B dominated UPA forces absorb or eliminate a rival organisation using the same UPA name. ^3,2

16. 21-25 August 1943: OUN-B holds its Third Extraordinary Assembly

    The organisation revises parts of its programme while maintaining political leadership over the expanding insurgency. ^1,2

17. 28 February 1944: Massacre of Huta Pieniacka

    IPN identifies the 4th Galician Volunteer SS Police Regiment under German command and additional UPA and local forces. ^15,16

18. 13-22 July 1944: Battle of Brody

    The SS “Galizien” division suffers catastrophic losses and is later rebuilt. ^4,20

19. July 1944: The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council is formed

    The body is intended to broaden political representation around OUN and UPA structures. ⁶

20. August 1944: The division receives a Waffen-Grenadier title

    The German administrative name changes during reconstruction, while institutional continuity within the Waffen-SS remains. ^4,21

21. April 1945: The division is assigned to the Ukrainian National Army

    The late renaming becomes central to postwar memory but does not remove the earlier Waffen-SS record. ^4,20

22. May 1945: The division surrenders to the Western Allies

    Its members enter internment and a new phase of legal, immigration and memory disputes. ^4,19

23. 30 September 1946: Nuremberg judgment on the SS

    The Tribunal includes the Waffen-SS in the criminal organisation declaration while stating conditions and exclusions for membership. ¹⁷

24. 30 December 1986: The Deschênes Commission submits its report

    The Canadian inquiry addresses alleged war criminals and rejects blanket substitution of unit membership for individual evidence. ^18,19

25. 4 September 2012: A major scholarly reassessment of the division is published

    Per Anders Rudling compares postwar heroic memory with archival evidence on ideology, command and associated atrocities. ²⁰

26. 27 July 2026: Editorial evidence cutoff

    The dossier records the current source base and leaves disputed unit-level claims explicitly marked. ^21,15

Edition and citation

A stable bibliographic reference for research, teaching and publication.

Editorial status

Published public dossier

Release

v3.14.4

Updated

July 28, 2026

Canonical address

https://upamemorials.org/en/dossier/oun-upa-galizien-police-formations/

Recommended citation

UPA Memorials, “OUN, UPA, SS “Galizien” and auxiliary police: how not to confuse them”, public dossier, v3.14.4, July 28, 2026, https://upamemorials.org/en/dossier/oun-upa-galizien-police-formations/

Source ledger

1. 1. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Reference work, Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, access checked July 27, 2026

   Reference history of OUN’s founding, ideology, 1940 split, wartime leadership and relationship with UPA.

2. 2. Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Reference work, Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, access checked July 27, 2026

   Reference overview of UPA’s competing origins, consolidation, territorial organisation and recruitment from auxiliary police.

3. 3. Polisian Sich, Reference work, Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, access checked July 27, 2026

   Reference account of Taras Borovets’s use of the UPA name and the later conflict with OUN-B forces.

4. 4. Division Galizien, Reference work, Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, access checked July 27, 2026

   Reference chronology of the division’s creation, command, combat history and late-war renaming.

5. 5. OUN expeditionary groups, Reference work, Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, access checked July 27, 2026

   Reference description of separate OUN-B and OUN-M expeditionary networks during the 1941 invasion.

6. 6. Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, Reference work, Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, access checked July 27, 2026

   Reference context for the political structure created around OUN and UPA in 1944.

7. 7. The Lwów Pogrom of July 1, 1941, Institutional source, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, access checked July 27, 2026

   Institutional account of OUN-B influence in Lviv, the 1941 political context and anti-Jewish violence.

8. 8. The Order Police, Institutional source, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, access checked July 27, 2026

   Institutional overview of German Order Police structures and their participation in Holocaust crimes.

9. 9. The Holocaust in Ukraine: New Sources and Perspectives, Scholarly work, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, access checked July 27, 2026

   Scholarly volume on German occupation structures, local collaboration, nationalist movements and the Holocaust in Ukraine.

10. 10. Stanislawów (now Ivano-Frankivsk), Institutional source, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, access checked July 27, 2026

    Institutional case study showing German police and Ukrainian auxiliary police acting together during ghetto operations.

11. 11. Ukrainian Nationalists and the Holocaust, Scholarly work, Yad Vashem Library, access checked July 27, 2026

    Scholarly synthesis on OUN, UPA, anti-Jewish violence, police recruitment and the 1943 transfer of policemen into the insurgency.

12. 12. Murder story of Rozyszcze Jews in the Kopaczewka Sand Quarry, Primary source index, Yad Vashem, access checked July 27, 2026

    Documented killing-site account distinguishing German gendarmerie and Ukrainian auxiliary police tasks.

13. 13. Murder story of Wiśniowiec Nowy Jews in the Wiśniowiec Ravine, Primary source index, Yad Vashem, access checked July 27, 2026

    Case record documenting German SD, gendarmerie and Ukrainian auxiliary police roles in a mass shooting.

14. 14. Murder Story of Torczyn Jews at the Torczyn Jewish Cemetery, Primary source index, Yad Vashem, access checked July 27, 2026

    Case record illustrating local police command, round-up duties and German-organised murder.

15. 15. Archiwum Pełne Pamięci: Zbrodnia w Hucie Pieniackiej, Institutional source, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, access checked July 27, 2026

    Current IPN description naming the 4th Galician Volunteer SS Police Regiment, UPA and local participating groups.

16. 16. 80. rocznica zbrodni w Hucie Pieniackiej, Institutional source, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, access checked July 27, 2026

    Institutional reconstruction distinguishing the 4th SS Police Regiment from the division and listing additional forces.

17. 17. Judgment: The Accused Organizations, The SS, Official legal act, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, access checked July 27, 2026

    Text of the International Military Tribunal judgment defining the criminal scope of the SS and its stated limitations.

18. 18. Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals, Report, Part One, Public, Official legal act, Government of Canada Publications, access checked July 27, 2026

    Official catalogue and public report of the Deschênes Commission on alleged war criminals in Canada.

19. 19. War criminals: the Deschênes Commission, Institutional source, Library of Parliament, Canada, access checked July 27, 2026

    Official parliamentary summary discussing blanket allegations, individual evidence and the Galicia Division.

20. 20. ‘They Defended Ukraine’: The 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Galizische Nr. 1) Revisited, Scholarly work, Lund University Research Portal, access checked July 27, 2026

    Peer-reviewed study of the division’s institutional history, ideology, command and association with atrocities.

21. 21. 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr. 1, auch ukrainische Nr. 1), archival record, Primary source index, Bundesarchiv via Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek, access checked July 27, 2026

    Archival index preserving the German administrative title and Bundesarchiv reference for the division.